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1263 
IT’S REASONABLE TO EXPECT PRIVACY WHEN WATCHING 
ADULT VIDEOS 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
NEW YORK COUNTY 
People v. Hemmings1 
(decided January 12, 2012) 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The New York City Police Department organized and con-
ducted a buy-and-bust operation in New York City, resulting in a 
positive identification of the defendant, subsequent arrest, and simul-
taneous seizure of certain illegal contraband found on his person.2  
The ghost officer in the operation, who shadowed the primary under-
cover officer, surveyed both the primary undercover officer and the 
suspect for approximately thirty minutes before each entered an adult 
DVD store.3  Soon after entering, the undercover officer exited the 
store and signaled to the ghost officer that he had purchased narcotics 
from the suspect (later identified as the defendant), which prompted 
the ghost officer alongside his undercover team to enter the premis-
es.4  After searching the first and third floors and finding no signs of 
the suspect, the ghost officer and his team proceeded to the second 
floor where they found approximately eight to ten viewing booths de-
signed for watching pornographic material.5 
Each booth had a door six to seven feet in height that 
“[a]lmost reached the floor and which could be locked.”6  Of those 
eight to ten booths, only two were closed, which prevented the ghost 
 
1 937 N.Y.S.2d 549 (Sup. Ct. 2012). 
2 Id. at 551.  This was conducted in the Times Square area early in the morning on Febru-
ary 16, 2011.  Id. 
3 Id.  While the suspect did fit a certain profile, stocky with a leather jacket, the ghost of-
ficer did not see the face of the suspect.  Id. 
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officer from seeing who was inside.7  According to the ghost officer, 
he approached the first booth with a closed door, discovered it was 
unlocked, and without knocking entered the booth and told the person 
inside to come out.8  Upon doing so, the officer acknowledged that he 
was unsure if the person inside the booth was the suspect he had been 
following, but further observed that there was a leather jacket and 
knapsack on the floor of the booth.9  The ghost officer then proceeded 
to the second booth with a closed door and ordered that occupant to 
come out.
10
  The officer noted that the suspect in the second booth 
clearly did not match the description of the suspect he had been fol-
lowing earlier and therefore let the second man go.11  At that point 
the ghost officer led the individual from the first booth outside where 
he was then identified by the primary undercover officer as the man 
who sold him the narcotics, the defendant in this case.12  Upon identi-
fication, the defendant was searched and forty-six dollars was recov-
ered from his person.  In addition to the money, the officers also 
seized the black leather jacket and knapsack belonging to the defend-
ant which were discovered in his booth.13 
At trial, the defendant sought to suppress both the evidence 
recovered by law enforcement as well as the identification by the 
primary undercover officer, alleging that “the police did not act law-
fully because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
booth.”14  Further, urging the court’s application of the exclusionary 
rule, the defendant sought to suppress both the identification and evi-
dence retrieved from his person, as the ill-gotten fruit of a poisonous 
tree.15 
 
7 Id. at 551-52. 
8 Id. at 552. 
9 Hemmings, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 552. 
10 Id.  
11 Id. 
12 Id.  This was done from a car-length away and while the defendant was in police custo-
dy.  Id. 
13 Hemmings, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 552.  The black leather jacket and the knapsack had been 
on the floor of the booth.  Id. 
14 Id. at 551-52 (noting that this would certainly cover the physical evidence if success-
ful). 
15 Id. at 556 (“Where the police lack probable cause, the exclusionary rule requires sup-
pression of the confirmatory identification.”); see also People v. Gethers, 654 N.E.2d 102, 
103 (N.Y. 1995) (noting that evidence recovered without probable cause is inadmissible); 
United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 467-69 (1980) (noting that the Court of Appeals 
agreed that the trial court was correct in ruling that the evidence was obtained without prob-
able cause). 
2
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The court granted the defendant’s application to suppress the 
identification and the physical evidence, finding each was obtained 
unlawfully.16  In making its determination, the court looked to the ex-
plicit language of the Fourth Amendment, which specifically states: 
[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized.17 
Based upon the protections afforded therein, the court arrived 
at two conclusions of law.18  First, over the People’s objections, the 
court found that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy while occupying a closed viewing booth inside of the adult video 
store.19  Second, that the mere fact that “a person may have a reason-
able expectation of privacy does not shield him from investigation by 
the police, but it [nevertheless] requires that before they may negate 
the privacy interest, they must have a sufficient basis to do so and 
must act reasonably.”20   
With respect to the court’s first conclusion, in an attempt to 
save both the identification and physical evidence from suppression, 
the People argued, that while the defendant inarguably maintained a 
subjective expectation of privacy inside the booth, his expectation 
was not one that “society recognizes as reasonable.”21  In support of 
this position, the People relied on precedent which provides in perti-
nent part that “[p]ublic areas of commercial premises are not afforded 
Fourth Amendment protection.”22  Despite acknowledging that priva-
cy may be afforded to an individual who, even though occupying a 
public space, takes reasonable steps to safeguard his or her privacy, 
the People insisted that “the defendant lacked a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the booth in this instance . . . because he did not 
 
16 Hemmings, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 556. 
17 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
18 Hemmings, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 553-54. 
19 Id. at 552-53. 
20 Id. at 554 (citing People v. Mercado, 501 N.E.2d 27 (1986)). 
21 Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). 
22 Id. at 553. 
3
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lock the door to the booth.”23 
The court rejected both of the People’s arguments, explaining 
at the outset that the presence, absence, or ultimate use “of a lock is 
not a determinative factor in deciding whether a person has a reason-
able expectation of privacy.”24  Rather, the court recognized that 
courts tend to construe an expectation of privacy as reasonable based 
upon “the nature of the activity involved, not the precise physical 
characteristics of the enclosure.”25  Thus, the court in Hemmings de-
termined that the defendant’s expectation of privacy was “objectively 
justifiable,”26 explaining it as analogous to the degree of privacy rea-
sonably afforded to an individual occupying a toilet stall, bedroom, or 
room wherein an individual intends to change his or her articles of 
clothing.27 
 With respect to the second conclusion, the court held that alt-
hough an individual may have a reasonable expectation of privacy, he 
or she is automatically shielded “from investigation by the police, but 
rather that before the police “negate a privacy interest, they must 
have a sufficient basis to do so and must act reasonably.”28  In turn, 
the court observed, as the New York Court of Appeals found in Peo-
ple v. Mercado,29 where the circumstances presented are sufficient to 
give the police “probable cause to believe that criminal activity [is] 
taking place in the [place to be searched]”, a search may be deemed 
reasonable notwithstanding an intrusion upon an individual’s reason-
able expectation of privacy.30  Likewise, the court recognized the ex-
igencies surrounding the situation might also justify the intrusion up-
on an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.31 
 
23 Hemmings, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 553. 
24 Id. (citing Mercado, 501 N.E.2d at 29). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 552 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. 347). 
27 Id. at 552-53 (citing Mercado, 501 N.E.2d at 29).  
28 Hemmings, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 554 (citing Mercado, 501 N.E.2d at 29). 
29 501 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1986). 
30 Hemmings, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 554 (citing Mercado, 501 N.E.2d at 29).  The court clari-
fied: 
[I]n passing on whether there was probable cause for an arrest, we con-
sistently have made it plain that the basis for such a belief must not only 
be reasonable, but it must appear to be at least more likely than not that a 
crime has taken place and that the one arrested is its perpetrator. 
Id. at 555 (quoting People v. Carrasquillo, 429 N.E.2d 775, 778 (N.Y. 1981)). 
31 Id. (citing Kroehler v. Scott, 391 F. Supp. 1114, 1119 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (“The Fourth 
Amendment requires, at a minimum, the determination by a detached official that there is 
4
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In this regard, the court noted that the police had reason to be-
lieve that the suspect was in the adult video store and had facts per-
taining to the suspect’s physical description, i.e., the police “knew 
that the [suspect] had a stocky build and was wearing a dark leather 
jacket.”32  Yet, the information and knowledge upon which the police 
relied was not enough to provide probable cause.33  Furthermore, the 
court noted that the police “had no basis to believe that [the defend-
ant] knew that [the police] had observed the drug sale or was aware 
of their presence”, and thus, they lacked justifiable concern that the 
defendant would attempt to escape.”34  Therefore, emphasizing (i) the 
overwhelming police presence throughout the store; (ii) the lack of 
danger to the police or risk of evidence being destroyed, or (iii) rea-
son to believe that the defendant “was engaged in criminal activity 
while he was in the booth,” the court found no exigent circumstances 
to justify the search.35  Rather, the court explained that “[t]he police 
could have simply waited a short while and apprehended [the defend-
ant] [] as he walked away from the booth.”36 
In turn, having found that “the defendant had an expectation 
of privacy in the booth” and that “the police did not act reasonably 
under the circumstances”, the court ruled to suppress both the de-
fendant’s identification and physical evidence retrieved by the police 
at trial.37  The court arrived at this conclusion in spite of the People’s 
argument that because “the identification took place outside the video 
store, the taint stemming from [the] improper seizure was attenuat-
ed”, and thus, did not require suppression under the exclusionary 
rule.38  In rejecting this contention, the court distinguished the prece-
dent that the People relied upon, noting that the police lacked proba-
ble cause to arrest the defendant in the instant case.39  However, the 
 
probable cause warranting a search prior to its commencement, or at least the presence of 
those rare exigent circumstances which justify a warrantless search.”). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Hemmings, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 555-56 (observing that defendant “was certainly not at-
tempting to escape from them, as he had closeted himself in a confined area with only one 
means of egress”). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 556. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. (citing People v. Ramos, 613 N.Y.S.2d 870, 873 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1994) (“The 
fact that the identification took place after the parties left the apartment sufficiently dissipat-
ed the taint of the warrantless entry.”). 
39 Compare Hemmings, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 556 (noting that the police did not have probable 
5
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court further acknowledged that the primary undercover officer might 
still be able to identify the defendant at trial, and ordered an inde-
pendent source hearing be held to rule on said matter.40 
There is little precedent directly on point regarding the expec-
tation of privacy that one is entitled to while occupying a closed vid-
eo booth within an adult video store, as was at issue in Hemmings.  
However, the court considered the appropriate, related precedent per-
taining to the Fourth Amendment protections that are guaranteed to 
individuals in places similarly occupied for the purpose of engaging 
in activities that are intimate in nature, and thus, society recognizes as 
warranting an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.  This 
case note explores the present standard used to determine when the 
Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s expectation of privacy 
and the exclusionary rule’s impact upon search and seizure jurispru-
dence.  Moreover, this case note considers how probable cause, exi-
gent circumstances, and the lapse of time impact a court’s decision in 
whether (i) governmental action was reasonable under the circum-
stances, and (ii) suppression is the appropriate remedy as a result of 
unlawful government action. 
II. THE FEDERAL APPROACH 
A. Redefining the Protections Afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment 
Although there exists good precedent that a person cannot 
maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in activities or infor-
mation exposed to the public at large,41 the United States Supreme 
 
cause to make the arrest), with Ramos, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 873 (noting that “the only illegality 
attaching to defendant’s arrest [was] that it was made after the police, without a warrant, im-
properly entered premises in which defendant had an expectation of privacy, notwithstanding 
that the record amply support[ed] that the police had probable cause to make such arrest at 
that time”). 
40 Hemmings, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 556 (citing Crews, 445 U.S. at 477).  In Crews, although 
the court determined that the police could not introduce “[t]he pretrial identification obtained 
through use of [a] photograph take during respondent’s illegal detention”, the Court never-
theless held that “the in-court identification [was] admissible . . . because the police’s 
knowledge of respondent’s identity and the victim’s independent recollections of him both 
antedated the unlawful arrest and were thus untainted by the constitutional violation.”  
Crews, 445 U.S. at 477. 
41 See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (recognizing that “when . . . 
the home is converted into a commercial center to which outsiders are invited for purposes 
of transacting unlawful business, that business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were 
6
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Court clarified in United States v. Katz,42 that what an individual 
“seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, 
may be constitutionally protected.”43  The Court noted that although 
its earlier interpretation of the Fourth Amendment was more restric-
tive, construing it to protect “only searches and seizures of tangible 
property . . . ‘the premise that property interests control the right of 
the Government to search and seize has been discredited.’ ”44  Thus, 
contrary to what the government argued, “the absence of such [physi-
cal] penetration . . . [did not] foreclose further Fourth Amendment in-
quiry.”45 
In Katz, the government monitored a person’s phone calls in-
side a public telephone booth.46  Notwithstanding the fact that the 
electronic listening device used by the government made no physical 
intrusion into the booth, as it was attached to the exterior of the booth 
occupied by the defendant, the Court recognized that the govern-
ment’s surveillance was an intrusion into the defendant’s privacy.47  
Moreover, the Court observed, while the defendant was visible to on-
lookers because the booth was made of glass, the defendant did not 
intend to prevent others from seeing him, but rather, sought to pre-
vent them from hearing him.48  In turn, the Court reasoned that the 
defendant, while occupying the public telephone booth, had a reason-
able expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.49  
The Court explained that a person in a telephone booth who “[s]huts 
the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call 
is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouth-
piece will not be broadcast to the world.”50 
 
carried on in a store, a garage, a car, or on the street”).  
42 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
43 Id. at 352. 
44 Id. at 353 (quoting Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)). 
45 Id. (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928), overruled in part by 
Katz, 389 U.S. 347). 
46 Id. at 348 (noting that the evidence obtained via surveillance showed that the defendant 
conveyed wagering information from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston in violation of fed-
eral statute). 
47 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348-49, 352 (noting that “[t]o read the Constitution more narrowly is 
to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communica-
tion”). 
48 Id. at 352 (observing that the court agreed with the government that the booth allowed 
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Although the Court in Katz reiterated the principle that “the 
Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply ‘areas’-against 
unreasonable searches and seizures”, the Court’s holding demon-
strates that the place which a person occupies is nevertheless a perti-
nent factor in deciding whether a person maintains a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.51  This notion is also illustrated in Kroehler v. 
Scott,52 in which the district court reviewed the constitutionality of 
“covert police observation of activities undertaken in toilet stalls in 
public restrooms.”53 
In Kroehler, “in response to complaints of homosexual and 
drug-related activity occurring in the public men’s room at the Penn 
Central Railroad Station and at Long Park, [the government] initiated 
a program of surveillance designed to . . . apprehend persons in-
volved in these criminal activities.”54  Under the program, “holes 
were drilled in the ceilings directly above the toilet stalls”, enabling 
the government actors who implemented the program “to peer covert-
ly into the stall[s] below and observe, unnoticed, whatever tran-
spired.”55  Those persons apprehended as a result of these observa-
tions filed suit, arguing that the surveillance program violated their 
right to privacy.56  Specifically, those apprehended alleged the pro-
gram was unconstitutional because it was implemented “without [the 
government actors] first obtaining a search warrant based upon a 
showing of probable cause that criminal activity was taking place 
therein or demonstrating at least the exigent circumstances which 
suspend the requirement of a warrant.57  In response, the government 
relied heavily on “the circumstances which gave rise to the surveil-
lance—namely, numerous complaints of criminal activities”, and 
urged the court find “the surveillance in question[] constitutionally 
proper, prompted by the threat thus posed to the innocent public.”58 
Ultimately, the court concluded that a person maintains a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy while occupying a toilet stall.59  Ob-
serving that the purpose of using a bathroom involves activities that 
 
51 Id. 
52 391 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
53 Id. at 1117. 
54 Id. at 1115. 
55 Id. at 1116. 
56 Id. 
57 Kroehler, 391 F. Supp. at 1116. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 1117. 
8
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are personal, intimate, and private by their nature, and having deter-
mined that the occupation of a bathroom stall warrants a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, the court further explained that this privacy 
expectation is not lost as a result of a person’s failure to utilize a door 
to prevent disclosure of his or her activities.60  Pertinent to the court’s 
rationale was the fact that the surveillance at issue enabled the gov-
ernment to view “not only those involved in criminal activity, but al-
so countless innocent and unknowing persons who reasonably ex-
pected and were properly entitled to a modicum of privacy.”61  
Therefore, explaining that “[t]he Fourth Amendment requires, at a 
minimum, the determination by a detached official that there is prob-
able cause warranting a search prior to its commencement, or at least 
the presence of those rare exigent circumstances which justify a war-
rantless search,” the court found “[t]he warrantless and non-selective 
search of all individuals who happen[ed] to be in the area [was not] 
justified under the circumstances.”62 
B. Application of the Exclusionary Rule Evaded by 
the Attenuation Principle 
The exclusionary rule is a judicially-crafted mandate which 
was “adopted to effectuate [and safeguard] the Fourth Amendment 
right of all citizens ‘to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ ”63  When the 
exclusionary rule is invoked, “evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment” should be suppressed, as the United States Su-
preme Court has long recognized that evidence unlawfully obtained 
“cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the il-
legal search and seizure.”64  In Wong Sun v. United States,65 the Su-
preme Court added further clarity to the exclusionary rule’s applica-
tion.  The Court observed that the exclusionary rule applies both to 
 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 1119; see also Bielicki v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 371 P.2d 288, 290 (Cal. 
1962) (noting that the court suppressed the evidence retrieved as a result of surveillance over 
toilet stalls on the ground that there was not probable cause to justify the intrusion into the 
individuals’ privacy and the surveillance allowed for the observation of the “innocent and 
guilty alike”). 
62 Kroehler, 391 F. Supp. at 1119. 
63 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV)). 
64 Id. (citing Weeks v. United States, 34 S. Ct. 341, 346 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)). 
65 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
9
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the evidence “traditionally barred . . . physical, tangible materials ob-
tained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion” and 
“testimony as to matters observed during an unlawful invasion.”66  In 
turn, the Court established precedent that has carried through search 
and seizure jurisprudence with great impact, articulating that “[t]he 
exclusionary prohibition extends [to both] the indirect [and] the direct 
products of such invasions.”67 
In Wong Sun, federal narcotics agents observed a suspect over 
the course of six weeks and he was subsequently arrested for heroin 
possession.68  Thereafter, following the suspect’s arrest, he gave up 
the person who he bought the heroin from, which information led the 
narcotics agents to the residence and business of the person the sus-
pect identified.69  Thereafter, without a search warrant, the officers 
entered the identified seller’s dwelling, at which time the alleged 
seller advised the narcotics officers that another individual, Johnny 
Yee, was allegedly the supplier of the drugs.70  Relying on this in-
formation, the officers then went to Yee’s residence, recovered sev-
eral tubes of heroin, and were then directed to the residence of yet 
another individual, Wong Sun, who was allegedly the original suppli-
er of the heroin.71 Wong Sun was arrested and convicted along with 
Yee.72 
At trial, Wong Sun argued the evidence obtained and present-
ed against him, specifically, his unsigned confession which was ob-
tained at the time of his arrest “without probable cause or reasonable 
grounds”73 was inadmissible as it was the fruit “of unlawful arrests or 
of attendant searches.”74  However, the Court rejected this contention, 
observing that although the arrest was in fact unlawfully made, Wong 
 
66 Id. (citing McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598, 603 (1st Cir. 1955) (explaining that 
there was “no basis in the cases or logic for distinguishing between the introduction into evi-
dence of physical objects illegally taken and the introduction of testimony concerning ob-
jects illegally observed”).  In Wong Sun, the Court considered the claims of more than one 
petitioner, each who alleged that the evidence obtained and presented against them at trial 
was unlawfully obtained.  Id. at 490-92.  However, for the purposes of this case note, only 
petitioner Wong Sun’s claim is explored. 
67 Id. at 484. 
68 Id. at 473. 
69 Id. at 473-74. 
70 Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 474. 
71 Id. at 475. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 491. 
74 Id. at  477. 
10
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Sun was nevertheless “released on his own recognizance after a law-
ful arraignment, and had returned voluntarily several days later to 
make the statement.”75  Thus, relying on the precedent previously set 
forth in Nardone v. United States,76 the Court held that “the connec-
tion between the arrest and the statement had ‘become so attenuated 
as to dissipate the taint.’ ”77  The holding in Wong Sun illustrates how 
the United States Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the exclu-
sionary rule as applicable only in limited circumstances to exclude a 
limited category of evidence. 
In United States v. Crews,78 the Supreme Court again exam-
ined the exclusionary rule and attenuation principle from Wong Sun 
and Nardone, observing that in addition to direct physical evidence, 
“items observed or words overheard in the course of the unlawful ac-
tivity, [and] confessions or statements of the accused obtained during 
an illegal arrest and detention” fall within the exclusionary rule’s 
realm and are subject to suppression.79 At issue in Crews was the 
constitutionality of “an in-court identification of the accused by the 
victim of a crime” where such identification stemmed from an unlaw-
ful arrest.”80  The constitutional challenge came as a result of an as-
sault and robbery after which respondent was questioned by the po-
lice, “tentatively identified,” questioned a second time, photographed 
without the police making a formal arrest or bringing charges, and 
subsequently identified which prompted an indictment.81 
After adopting “the trial court’s finding that respondent was 
detained without probable cause”82 and assessing each element of 
“[a] victim’s in-court identification of the accused”,83 the Court con-
 
75 Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at at 491. 
76 308 U.S. 338 (1939). 
77 Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491. 
78 445 U.S. 463 (1980). 
79 Id. at 470 (citing Dunway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979) (observing that 
“[w]hen there is a close causal connection between the illegal seizure and the confession, not 
only is exclusion of the evidence more likely to deter similar police misconduct in the future, 
but also use of the evidence is more likely to compromise the integrity of the courts”). 
80 Id. at 465. 
81 Id. at 465-69. 
82 Id. at 469. 
83 Crews, 445 U.S. at 471. 
A victim's in-court identification of the accused has three distinct ele-
ments. First, the victim is present at trial to testify as to what transpired 
between her and the offender, and to identify the defendant as the culprit. 
Second, the victim possesses knowledge of and the ability to reconstruct 
the prior criminal occurrence and to identify the defendant from her ob-
11
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cluded the challenged identification was “not the product of any po-
lice misconduct.”84  Rather, explaining that the “the illegal arrest [did 
not] infect the victim’s ability to give accurate identification testimo-
ny” and recognizing the time lapse between the unconstitutional ac-
tion and the evidence in question and the number of links in the chain 
between each act, the Court found that “the toxin in this case was in-
jected only after the evidentiary bud had blossomed [and] the fruit 
served at trial was not poisoned.”85 
Thereafter, in New York v. Harris,86 the Court further estab-
lished that the attenuation principle might permit the government to 
introduce a confirmatory identification even where the identification 
was unlawfully procured.87  In Harris, the Court accepted the lower 
court’s finding that the defendant “did not consent to the police offic-
ers’ entry into his home and the conclusion that the police had proba-
ble cause to arrest him.”88  However, in assessing and determining 
how to resolve the facts before it, the Court stated that it would not 
“adopt a ‘per se’ or ‘but for’ rule that would make inadmissible any 
evidence, whether tangible or live-witness testimony, which some-
how came to light through a chain of causation that began with an il-
legal arrest.”89 
The Court observed that the defendant had not authorized the 
police to enter his home and the police did so without a warrant.90  
This effectively cast a shadow upon whether all evidence as the result 
of an illegal arrest would be deemed the forbidden fruit of such an 
unlawful arrest.91  While, the Court recognized that “the indirect 
fruits of an illegal search or arrest should be suppressed when they 
bear a sufficiently close relationship to the underlying illegality,”92 
the Court ultimately determined that because the police maintained a 
right to question the defendant before arresting him, any information 
 
servations of him at the time of the crime. And third, the defendant is al-
so physically present in the courtroom, so that the victim can observe 
him and compare his appearance to that of the offender. 
Id.  
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 472. 
86 495 U.S. 14 (1990). 
87 Id. at 17. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 18 (quoting United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276 (1978)). 
90 Id. at 17.  
91 Harris, 495  U.S. at 18 (citing Crews, 445 U.S. at 474). 
92 Id. at 19. 
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they got upon questioning him, even after the illegal arrest, was sub-
ject to attenuation.93 
III. THE NEW YORK STATE APPROACH 
A. Defining an Individual’s Expectation of Privacy by 
the Place of Occupancy 
In People v. Mercado,94 the court was asked to determine 
whether the police, in making an instantaneous investigation into the 
men’s rest room at Kennedy Airport, acted unreasonably when stand-
ing on top of the commode within a bathroom stall in order to peer 
over and into an adjoining stall occupied by the defendant.95  This ac-
tion was prompted by an unidentified man’s tip to the police that 
“there were two men in a toilet stall in the restroom.”96  An officer 
entered, confirmed that two men were in fact within one stall, as he 
could hear their voices, but was unable to conclusively determine the 
substance of their conversation.97 
Thereafter, the officer tried “to peer through the space be-
tween the door and the frame,” but his view was blocked; he could 
however, view the defendant, who was “sitting on top of the flushing 
unit with his feet resting on the toilet bowl.”98  The officer then “en-
tered the adjoining stall, stood on the commode and looked down into 
the occupied stall.”99  As a result of gaining this view, the officer ob-
served “an open glassine envelope containing white powder”, which 
the defendant flushed upon realizing that the officer had discovered 
them.100  The men exited the stall upon order and “19 ‘nickel bags’ of 
heroin” were retrieved after the police conducted a pat-down 
search.101  Over the defendant’s objection at trial that the evidence 
used against him had been unlawfully obtained, and thus, required 
suppression, he was indicted and sentenced.102 
 
93 Id. 
94 501 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1986). 
95 Id. at 28-29. 
96 Id. at 29. 
97 Id. at 28. 
98 Id. at 28-29. 
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The issue before the court in Mercado was “whether defend-
ant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officer 
looked into the stall.”103  Because “[t]he enclosure exists precisely to 
insure privacy and to shield its occupant from public view,” the court 
explained that “an expectation of privacy in a public rest room stall is 
reasonable.”104  The court reasoned that “[o]nce the door is closed, an 
individual is entitled to assume that while inside he or she will not be 
viewed by others.”105  However, the court also recognized that “since 
the Fourth Amendment protects against only unreasonable intrusions, 
a search may be justified by the existence of probable cause to be-
lieve that a crime has occurred, is occurring or is about to take 
place.”106 
In order to determine whether the officer had probable cause 
the court considered the circumstances of the incident, specifically 
noting that the officer (i) was on the job “working in airport securi-
ty”; (ii) entered the bathroom and peered into the stall to investigate a 
tip; and (iii) made observations from which reasonable inferences 
could be drawn to conclude that “the stall was not being used for its 
intended purpose.”107  Emphasizing that “[p]robable cause does not 
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” the court in found that the 
officer had probable cause and his conduct was reasonable under the 
circumstances.108  The court in Mercado explained that after the of-
ficer’s “suspicions [were] heightened by what he saw and heard from 
afar, the officer was not compelled to turn heel and leave the rest 
room.”109  Rather, the officer was justified in taking reasonable steps 
“to learn what was going on inside” of the stall.110 
In People v. Milom,111 the court established that “not every in-
stance of police surveillance in a public rest room constitutes a 
 
103 Id. 
104 Mercado, 501 N.E.2d at 29. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 29-30. 
108 Id. at 30. 
109 Mercado, 501 N.E.2d at 30. 
110 Id.; see also People v. Green, 507 N.Y.S.2d 408, 409 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1986) (“De-
spite the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the restroom stall, the information 
received by the police from the victim, when coupled with their own observations, provided 
them with a reasonable basis to enter the stall and, upon observing the gun, they had proba-
ble cause to arrest the defendant.”). 
111 428 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1980). 
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Fourth Amendment violation.”112  Rather, as is the case with all 
Fourth Amendment challenges, whether or not there is an expectation 
of privacy and whether or not it is reasonable varies based upon the 
underlying circumstances.113  In Milom, an officer looked through the 
window of a bar bathroom and observed the defendant in possession 
of a white power and snorting that white powder along with several 
other individuals.114  The officer then confronted the defendant, con-
firmed that the white powder was narcotics, which he retrieved from 
the defendant a along with a silver measuring spoon and substantial 
sum of cash.115  At trial, the defendant argued that the officer’s “sur-
veillance of the rest room constituted a search within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment [and was] not justified by exigent circum-
stances and [was conducted] without benefit of a warrant.”116  Alt-
hough cognizant of the fact that in many, if not most instances, indi-
viduals maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy while in a 
bathroom, the court focused on the open area in which the defendant 
chose to expose and use his drugs.117  Specifically, the court in Milom 
noted that the defendant did not engage in conduct privately within a 
bathroom stall, but rather occupied the rest room’s “public” area.118  
In turn, the court established, “[t]here is no justified expectation of 
privacy as to incriminating conduct which occurs in the public area of 
a rest room rather than inside one of the stalls.”119 
In order to find harmony between the holding in Mercado, the 
existing precedent related to bathroom stalls, as reiterated in Milom, 
and the court’s conclusion in People v. Saunders,120 it is necessary to 
carefully consider the particular facts involved before turning to the 
issue before the court.  In Saunders, the search and seizure at issue 
occurred as a result of the defendant’s visit to the Adolescent Recep-
tion Center on Rikers Island.121  The officer on duty at the time of his 
visit directed all visitors to dispose of any and all contraband in an 
“amnesty box” and advised the visitors that such disposal could be 
 
112 Id. at 681. 
113 Id. at 680. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Milom, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 680. 
117 Id. at 680-81. 
118 Id. at 681. 
119 Id. 
120 531 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. 1988). 
121 Id. at 988. 
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made “with ‘no questions asked.’ ”122 The defendant was also told 
that all personal belongings were to be secured in lockers and were 
not permitted inside the prison during the visit with an inmate.123  
Thereafter the defendant entered the toilet facilities which were lo-
cated in close proximity to the area which was being patrolled by the 
officer on duty.124  The lock on the toilet stall that the defendant oc-
cupied “was apparently broken.”125  The officer then entered the toilet 
facilities, heard “a loud sniffing sound,” and inquired about it.126  
Without any objection, the defendant turned around to face the of-
ficer, revealing “a quantity of white powder on the [his] face—more 
particularly, on his ‘nose, lip and mouth.’ ”127 
The facts in Saunders are important to understand the court’s 
holding that the defendant, when occupying the bathroom stall at the 
correctional institution, did not have an objectively reasonable expec-
tation of privacy that is protected by the Fourth Amendment.128  In 
arriving at this conclusion, the court observed that “one’s expectation 
of privacy while within the confines or even upon the perimeter of a 
correctional institution is less than such expectation would be outside 
the institution.”129  However, the court nevertheless noted that every 
Fourth Amendment challenge should be assessed by “an objective 
standard [that strives for a balance] between zealous government 
agents and private citizens.”130 
Thus, turning to the circumstances of this encounter, the court 
recognized that the search and seizure was made by “a prison security 
officer, [who] as part of his assigned duties, [took] note of something 
evident to his sense of hearing.”131  Reasoning that the officer’s con-
duct was reasonable under the circumstances, the court explained that 
“[t]he notion that a prison setting affords the same guarantee of pro-
tection from warrantless police intrusion as the sanctity of the home 





125 Saunders, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 988. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 987. 
129 Id. at 992. 
130 Saunders, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 992. 
131 Id. at 992-93. 
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sense and reality.”132 
In People v. Diaz,133 the court clarified that there is not “much 
distinction between the privacy which people have a right to expect 
in public restrooms from that which they hope to find in fitting 
rooms.”134  In Diaz, a “special patrolman” in a department store, as-
signed to prevent theft and to apprehend those who commit such a 
crime, witnessed the defendants place a scarf into a knapsack.135 Af-
ter viewing the defendants enter a fitting room with items, the special 
patrolman gained a vantage point above the fitting room and viewed 
the defendants remove price tags from the clothing that they proceed-
ed to place in a knapsack.136  As a result of discovering the theft that 
occurred, the defendants were detained and arrested.137 
When the circumstances preceding the arrest were later chal-
lenged at trial, the court first observed, “there can be no reasonable 
expectation of privacy as to those things which are fully disclosed 
and generally noticeable by the public at large.”138  Thus, the court 
explained, crucial in determining whether a reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists involves looking to “the nature of the activity involved 
and whether an individual engaged in that activity may reasonably 
believe that he may perform it in private.”139  The court recognized, 
“[t]he function of a fitting room is, after all, to provide a place where 
a customer can try on items of clothing in private, undisturbed from 
the observation of others.”140  The court also considered that clothing 
stores in particular have had great difficulty “in dealing with the 
problem of theft.”  However, observing that “there are far less intru-
sive security measures which [stores] can utilize [rather] than resort-
ing to surreptitious spying on shoppers as they undress,” the court 
found the fitting room surveillance was unreasonable and violated the 




133 376 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Crim. Ct. 1975). 
134 Id. at 854. 
135 Id. at 850-51. 
136 Id. at 851. 
137 Id. 
138 Diaz, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 853 (citing Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968)). 
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B. Application of the Attenuation Principle 
In People v. Gethers,142 the court applied the exclusionary 
rule and suppressed an “on-the-scene identification . . . as a product 
of [an] illegal arrest.”143  The case came before the court on a motion 
to suppress both tangible evidence and an identification that resulted 
from a “buy and bust” drug operation in Manhattan.144  The under-
cover detective bought illegal narcotics and subsequently relayed to 
another officer the descriptions of both the defendant and another 
man, who were arrested by that officer and led to a street corner in 
order for the undercover officer to confirm the suspects’ identifica-
tion.145  The undercover officer then identified the two suspects as the 
dealers.146 
At a pre-trial suppression hearing, the court determined that 
the police did not have probable cause to arrest the two individuals.147  
The court further observed that “[t]he casual link between the arrest 
and identification is obvious and unattenuated.”148  In its conclusion, 
the court noted that the illegal seizure and detention of the defendants 
not only made the identification possible, but was done for the pur-
pose of displaying them to the undercover officer and thereby secur-
ing a pretrial identification to be used at the trial to bolster her in-
court identification.”149  Thus, the court suppressed the confirmatory 
identification and ordered that an independent source hearing be held 
to determine whether the officer would be permitted to make an “in-
court identification . . . sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of 
the primary taint.”150 
However, as demonstrated by the court’s ruling in People v. 
Ramos,151 circumstances arise in which the exclusionary rule will not 
mandate suppression of evidence despite the fact that it was unlaw-
fully come upon.  In Ramos, the court concluded that the defendant’s 
arrest was unlawful because the police did not have a warrant when 
 
142 654 N.E.2d 102 (N.Y. 1995). 




147 Gethers, 654 N.E.2d at 104. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 105 (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488). 
151 613 N.Y.S.2d 870 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1994). 
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they entered premises “in which [the defendant] had a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy.”152  Therefore, since the arrest was improper, 
the court established that the physical evidence seized from the prem-
ises at that time was “fruit” of the unlawful arrest, and thus, required 
suppression.153 
However, noting that “a confirmatory identification would 
normally be suppressed if defendant had been unlawfully detained by 
the police,”154 the court nevertheless concluded that under the facts 
presented there was “no need to suppress the identification under the 
Fourth Amendment.”155  Rather, emphasizing that “the identification 
took place after the parties left the apartment sufficiently dissipated 
the taint of the warrantless entry.”156 
V. CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated by the case law and various doctrines ex-
plored herein, both federal and New York State courts have endeav-
ored to strike a balance between the need for the police to have some 
leeway to conduct warrantless searches and the need to safeguard the 
rights intended by our framers to be afforded to every citizen of the 
United States, whether suspected, found guilty, or otherwise innocent 
to the criminal activity at issue.  The court in Hemmings arrived at its 
decision after a careful analysis of the specific circumstances preced-
ing and surrounding the defendant’s encounter with the police.  Ab-
sent exigent circumstances or at least probable cause to justify the na-
ture of the intrusion at issue, the court rendered its decision in an 
effort to protect the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  
The court’s ruling is not only consistent with, but flows directly from 
the seminal decision of the United States Supreme Court in Katz—
what an individual “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area ac-
cessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected”157—
especially when that individual shuts the door behind him. 
 
 




156 Ramos, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 872-73. 
157 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. 
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